We present a functional framework for automated Bayesian and worst-case mechanism design, based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants. At the core of our framework is a black-box optimization algorithm which guides the process of evaluating candidate mechanisms. We apply the approach to several classes of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, producing optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms using various objective functions. By comparing our results with known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known mechanisms, we provide evidence that ours is a promising approach to parametrized mechanism design for infinite Bayesian games.
Nobel-awarded major advances) produce analytical results characterizing ideal mechanisms under specified conditions. In practice, the theory has often informed the design of actual mechanisms, despite the deviation of the given real-world situation from theoretical conditions. For this reason and others, successful application of mechanism design principles needs to be embedded within a broader engineering perspective [26] .
A key difficulty in practical mechanism design is the presence of idiosyncratic objectives and constraints. For example, when the US government tried to set up a mechanism to sell radio spectrum licenses, it identified among its objectives promotion of rapid deployment of new technologies. Additionally, it imposed constraints such as ensuring that some licenses go to minority-owned and women-owned companies [17] .
Conitzer and Sandholm [5, 6] introduced the phrase automated mechanism design (AMD) to refer to the approach of formulating and computationally solving specific instances of mechanism design, cast as optimization problems, given arbitrary objectives and constraints. They have studied various classes of AMD problems, generally focusing on solutions in the form of direct truthful mechanisms. This reliance has at its core the revelation principle [19] , which states that the outcome of any given mechanism can still be achieved if we restrict the design space to mechanisms that induce truthful revelation of agent preferences. Despite this result, there may be computational reasons not to adopt the prescriptions of this principle, as pointed out by Conitzer and Sandholm [7] . Furthermore, the revelation principle may simply fail to hold in the face of mechanism constraints. For example, in a combinatorial setting, communication constraints may preclude the revelation of preferences over all possible bundles. While the computational criticisms can often be addressed to some degree within the spirit of direct mechanisms (e.g., by multi-stage mechanisms, such as ascending auctions, which implement partial revelation of agent preferences in a series of steps), idiosyncratic constraints on the design problem generally present a more difficult hurdle.
We introduce an approach to the design of general mechanisms (direct or indirect) given arbitrary designer objectives and arbitrary constraints on the design space, which we allow to be continuous. Our mechanisms induce games of incomplete information in which agents may have infinite sets of strategies and types. As in most mechanism design literature, we assume that the designer knows the set of all possible agent types and their distribution, but not the actual type realizations. Our methods build on our previous work on empirical mechanism design [30] , as well as related work on parametric evolutionary auction design [4, 22, 23] . The approach of [13, 14] to automated design of linear redistribution mechanisms is also similar in spirit. In place of the linear programming formulation of that work, we adopt a more general search framework, albeit restricted in our implementation to a particular class of infinite games of incomplete information. We further simplify the mechanism design domain by restricting search to some subset of an n-dimensional Euclidean space, rather than in an arbitrary function space, as would be required in a completely general setting. Our premise is that many practical design problems involve search for the optimal or nearly optimal setting of parameters within an existing infrastructure. For example, it is more likely that policymakers will seek an appropriate tax rate to achieve their objective than overhaul the entire tax system.
In the following sections, we present our framework for AMD and test it in several application domains. We specifically look at two settings: Bayesian and worst-case. In both settings, we assume that the designer knows the probability distribution over agent types. The difference is in the designer's optimization criterion. In the Bayesian setting, the designer simply maximizes expected value of the objective function. In the worst-case setting, the designer maximizes the value of the worst outcome. Since it is impossible to guarantee computationally that a particular mechanism is robust with respect to every realization of agent types, we introduce the notion of probably approximately robust mechanism design, which instead aims to probabilistically ensure that very few type profiles can result in poor outcomes for the designer. Our results suggest that this framework has much promise: most of the designs that we discover automatically are nearly as good as or better than the best known hand-built designs in the literature.
This article makes four contributions. The first is conceptual: we offer a general framework for designing mechanisms entirely computationally, either from scratch, or starting with a known acceptable mechanism. Our framework can be applied to truthful mechanism design (as illustrated in Sect. 6), but is not restricted to this case. It can easily incorporate external information (e.g., a characterization of truthful mechanisms in the specified design space) when available. The framework is composed of two main pieces: a stochastic search algorithm, which performs the actual search in the design space, and a game solver, which obtains a solution or a set of solutions for any game induced by a design choice. These pieces, as well as other elements of the framework, such as the designer's objective and constraints, can be independently implemented. Our second contribution is an approach for probabilistic relaxation of classes of mechanism design constraints, as well as of robust optimization, which allows for sensitivity analysis of results. Our third contribution is an actual implementation of our framework, operationalized for a restricted class of games with two players, a set of constraints commonly used in mechanism design, and several objective functions of general interest. Our fourth contribution is verification of practical feasibility and generality of our approach, performed via a series of examples of varying degree of complexity. We demonstrate generality by moving with ease between different problem settings (i.e., different objectives, constraints, and problem specifications such as Bayesian and worst-case mechanism design) while staying within the same framework and, indeed, within the same basic implementation.
Game notation
We restrict our attention to one-shot games of incomplete information, denoted by [I, {A i }, {T i }, F(·), {u i (a, t)}], where I refers to the set of players and m = |I | is the number of players. A i is the set of actions available to player i ∈ I , and A = A 1 ×· · ·× A m is the joint action space. T i is the set of types (private information) of player i, with T = T 1 × · · · × T m representing the joint type space. Since players know their own types prior to taking an action, but do not know types of others, we allow them to condition their actions on own type. Thus, we define a strategy of a player i to be a function s i : T i → A i , and S i the space of such strategies. For a joint strategy s ∈ S = S 1 × · · · × S m , s(t) denotes the vector (s 1 (t 1 
), . . . , s m (t m )). F(·) is the distribution over the joint type space.
It is often convenient to refer to a strategy of player i separately from that of the remaining players. To accommodate this, we use s −i to denote the joint strategy of all players other than player i. Similarly, t −i designates the joint type of all players other than i.
We define the payoff (utility) function of each player i by u i : A × T → R, where u i (a i , t i , a −i , t −i ) indicates the payoff to player i with type t i for playing action a i ∈ A i when the remaining players with joint types t −i play a −i . Given a strategy profile s ∈ S, the expected payoff of player
Faced with such a game, we assume that players play optimally against each other.
While our focus here is on pure strategy equilibria, we note that our framework naturally incorporates mixed strategies, as long as a solver is available to compute (or approximate) mixed strategy equilibria.
Mechanism design on Bayesian games
We can model the strategic interactions between the designer of the mechanism and its participants as a two-stage game [30] . The designer moves first by selecting a value θ from a set of allowable mechanism settings, Θ. All the participant agents observe the mechanism parameter θ and move simultaneously thereafter. For example, the designer could be deciding between a first-price and a second-price sealed-bid auction mechanism, with the presumption that after the choice has been made, the bidders participate with full awareness of the auction rules.
Since the participants know the mechanism parameter, we define a game between them in the second stage as
We refer to Γ θ as the game induced by θ .
The design objective takes the form W (s(t, θ), t, θ), where s(t, θ) is a solution or a prediction of outcome of agent play. As is common in the mechanism design literature, we evaluate mechanisms with respect to a specific Bayes-Nash equilibrium solution, s(t, θ). 1 Significantly, the objective may be specified algorithmically by a procedure that outputs a real number representing the objective value for any combination of mechanism parameter, solution, and joint type.
Note that an equilibrium solution s(t, θ) is a function of player types, since each player is presumed to observe its type prior to making a strategic choice. Below, we also use the short notation s(θ ) to denote the equilibrium strategy profile, which in the Bayesian setting is a profile of functions of player types. Since the designer's objective depends on player types, either indirectly due to its dependence on the player strategies, or directly through the type argument, we need to transform the type-dependent specification of the objective,
. That is, we need to summarize the objective value by some transformation with respect to the type distribution (e.g., expectation). We refer to this transformation as objective evaluation. In Sect. 3.4 we present two principled approaches for evaluating the objective with respect to a distribution of player types.
In addition to the objective function, the designer may specify a collection of constraints on the outcomes (solutions) induced by the corresponding design choices. Let the constraints be specified as C = {C i (s(t, θ), t, θ)}, although these may likewise be provided in the form of an algorithm that returns true if the constraint is satisfied and false otherwise for the given setting of the specified arguments.
Observe that if we knew s(t, θ) as a function of θ , the designer would simply be faced with an optimization problem. This follows by backwards induction, which would have us find s(t, θ) first for every θ and then compute an optimal mechanism with respect to these equilibria. If the design space were small, backwards induction applied to our model would thus yield an algorithm for optimal mechanism design. Indeed, if additionally the games Γ θ featured small sets of players, strategies, and types, we would say little more about the Fig. 1 Automated mechanism design procedure based on black-box optimization subject. Our goal, however, is to develop a mechanism design tool for settings in which it is infeasible to obtain a solution of Γ θ for every θ ∈ Θ, either because the space of possible mechanisms is large, or because solving (or approximating solutions to) Γ θ is computationally daunting. Additionally, we try to avoid making assumptions about the objective function or constraints on the design problem or the agent type distributions. In our computational studies below, we do restrict the games to two players with piecewise-linear utility functions, but allow them to have infinite strategy and type sets.
In short, we propose the following high-level procedure for finding optimal mechanisms:
1. Select a candidate mechanism, θ . 2. Find (approximate) solutions to Γ θ . 3. Evaluate the objective and constraints given solutions to Γ θ . 4. Repeat this procedure for a specified number of steps. 5.
Return an approximately optimal design based on the resulting optimization path.
We visually represent this procedure by a diagram in Fig. 1 . Below, we instantiate this procedure using a concrete black-box optimization routine and elucidate its first three steps, thereby presenting a full parametrized mechanism design framework for Bayesian games.
Designer's optimization problem
We begin by treating the designer's problem as black-box optimization, where the black box produces a noisy evaluation of the designer's objective, W (s(θ ), θ ). Once we frame the problem as black-box optimization, we can draw on a wealth of literature devoted to algorithms for this setting [28] . Whereas we can in principle select any one of these, we adopt simulated annealing for this study, as it has proved quite effective for a great variety of simulation optimization problems in noisy settings with many local optima [8, 10, 27] . By instantiating the high-level procedure above with simulated annealing, we obtain the following procedure, to which we refer below as the AMD framework: 
Repeat steps 2-4 until termination criterion reached. 6. Return the best design found.
In this procedure, p k (W k−1 , W k ) is the Metropolis acceptance probability [28] , defined by:
where M k is a schedule of "temperatures" which govern the degree of exploration of inferior candidate neighborhoods performed by the algorithm. We opt for a relatively simple adaptive implementation of simulated annealing, with normally distributed random perturbations applied to the solution candidate θ k in every iteration to obtain the candidate mechanism θ k+1 . That is,
We use an exponentially decreasing sequence of variances in our implementation of the algorithm. 3 To complete the algorithmic specification of the mechanism design problem, we allow the designer to specify the distribution of player types as a black box from which samples of type profiles can be drawn. Thus, we must use numerical techniques to evaluate the objective with respect to player types, thereby introducing sampling noise into the process.
As an application of black-box optimization, the mechanism design problem in our formulation is just one of many problems that can be addressed with one of a selection of methods. What makes it special is the subproblem of evaluating the objective function for a given mechanism choice, and the particular nature of mechanism design constraints which are evaluated based on Nash equilibrium outcomes and agent types.
Computing Nash equilibria
As implied by the backwards induction process, we must obtain solutions (Bayes-Nash equilibria in the current setting) of the games induced by the design choice, θ , in order to evaluate the objective function. In general, this is simply not possible, since Bayes-Nash equilibria may not even exist in an arbitrary game, nor is there a general-purpose tool to find them when they do. However, there are a number of tools that can find or approximate solutions in specific settings. For example, Gambit [16] is a general-purpose toolbox of solvers that can find Nash equilibria in finite games, although the runtime is often prohibitive for even moderately sized games. Vorobeychik and Wellman [31] offer general-purpose methods for approximating Nash equilibria in infinite games specified using stochastic simulations; one of these is provably convergent (in probability) to a Nash equilibrium (if one exists). Vorobeychik [29] performs simulation-based Bayes-Nash equilibrium and mechanism design analysis of a mathematically intractable class of sponsored-search auctions. Ganzfried and Sandholm [12] recently introduced a mixed-integer linear programming formulation for infinite games, which computes equilibria given a specified threshold-strategy form known to cover all solutions.
In this work, we employ a best-response finder introduced by Reeves and Wellman [25] (henceforth, RW), applying it iteratively to obtain sample Bayes-Nash equilibria for a restricted class of infinite two-player games of incomplete information. Whereas RW is often effective in converging to a sample Bayes-Nash equilibrium, it does not do so always. To deal with non-convergent cases, we take the conservative approach of discarding any design choices for which the solver does not produce an answer. In any case, RW does usually return a nearly exact equilibrium solution, which allows us to focus on the mechanism design problem rather than equilibrium computation itself.
Dealing with constraints
Mechanism design can feature any of the following three classes of constraints: ex ante (constraints evaluated with respect to the joint distribution of types), ex interim (evaluated separately for each player and type with respect to the joint type distribution of other players), and ex post (evaluated for every joint type profile). When the type space is infinite we of course cannot numerically evaluate any expression for every type. We therefore replace these constraints with probabilistic constraints that must hold for a set of types which has a large probability measure. For example, an ex post individual rationality (IR) constraint would need to hold only for a set of type profiles that occurs with probability greater than 0.95. 4 Intuitively, it is unlikely to matter if a constraint fails on a set of types which occurs with probability zero. We conjecture, further, that in most practical design problems, violation of a constraint on a low-measure set of types will also be of little consequence, either because the resulting design is easy to fix, or because the other types will likely not have very beneficial deviations even if they account in their decisions for the effect of these unlikely types on the game dynamics. We support this conjecture via a series of applications of our framework; in none of these did our constraint relaxation lead the designer much astray.
To verify probabilistic constraints over types, we evaluate the constraints on samples drawn from the type distribution. Since we can take only a finite number of samples, we verify a probabilistic constraint only at some level of confidence. The following theorem provides a lower bound on the number of samples required to achieve a given confidence level. Note that this result applies only for a given mechanism. Since we are running the optimization routine for a number of iterations, verifying the constraint in each, we may wish to know the probability that the constraint holds every time it is evaluated during the optimization run. Suppose that the constraint has been found to hold L times. It is then easy to see that if the constraint is p-satisfied in each instance with probability 1 − α, then the probability it is satisfied in all
Theorem 1
Evaluation of an ex ante and ex interim constraint requires one to compute the value of an expectation which in general can only be done numerically. If we use Monte Carlo sampling (as we do in our implementation) to estimate the expectation, we introduce noise into constraint evaluation which the above theorem does not account for. Such noise is especially problematic when many samples are taken: if the constraint holds relatively tightly, it is quite likely that at least one estimate will be especially unfavorable, and the constraint will appear to be violated. 5 In our current implementation, we address this problem heuristically by declaring a constraint violated only if some evaluation exceeds an allowed tolerance level (which we set to 0.01 in most cases and 0.07 in several others).
We next describe three specific constraints employed in our applications.
Equilibrium convergence constraint Given that the game solutions are produced by a heuristic (iterative best-response) algorithm, they are not inherently guaranteed to represent equilibria of the candidate mechanism. We can instead enforce this property through an explicit constraint. The purpose of this constraint is to ensure that every mechanism is indeed evaluated with respect to a true equilibrium (or near-equilibrium) strategy profile, given our assumption that a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a relevant predictor of agent play. For example, best-response dynamics using RW need not converge at all.
Definition 2 Let s(t)
be the last strategy profile in a sequence of best-response iterations, and let s (t) immediately precede s(t) in this sequence. Then the equilibrium convergence constraint is satisfied if for every joint type profile of players, (|s(t) − s (t)| < δ) for some a priori fixed tolerance level δ. 6 The problem that we cannot in practice evaluate this constraint for every joint type profile is resolved by making it probabilistic, as described above.
Definition 3 Let s(t) be the last strategy profile produced in a sequence of solver iterations, and let s (t) immediately precede s(t) in this sequence. Then the (1 − p)-strong equilibrium convergence constraint is satisfied if for a set of type profiles t with probability measure no less than 1 − p, |s(t) − s (t)| < δ for some a priori fixed tolerance level δ.
Ex interim IR Ex-Interim-IR specifies that for every agent and type, the agent's expected utility conditional on its type is greater than its opportunity cost of participating in the mechanism.
Definition 4
The ex interim IR constraint is satisfied when for every agent i ∈ I , and for every type
, where c i (t i ) is the opportunity cost to agent i with type t i of participating in the mechanism.
Again, in the AMD framework, we must modify the classical definition of Ex-Interim-IR to a probabilistic constraint as described above.
Definition 5 (1− p)-strong ex interim IR
is satisfied when for every agent i ∈ I , and for a set of types t i ∈ T i with probability measure no less than 1− p:
is the opportunity cost of agent i with type t i of participating in the mechanism, and δ is some a priori fixed tolerance level.
Commonly in the mechanism design literature the opportunity cost of participation, c i (t i ), is taken to be zero.
While we attempt here a very general framework, there is a special opportunity offered by the nature of IR constraints that cannot be ignored: these can always be satisfied if the designer offers a sufficiently large payment to agents for participating in an auction. 7 This, of course, has a consequence for the designer's revenue, and therefore there is intimate interplay between IR and revenue. To keep things general, we implement the IR constraint below equivalently to all other constraints, but once a final mechanism is identified, we apply a "fix" to ensure that it holds as close to opportunity cost as possible, either lowering or raising the designer's revenue accordingly.
Minimum revenue constraint
The final constraint that we consider ensures that the designer will obtain some minimal amount of revenue (or bound its loss) in attaining a non-revenuerelated objective.
Definition 6
The minimum revenue constraint is satisfied if E t [k(s(t), t)] ≥ C, where k(s(t), t) is the total payment made to the designer by agents with joint strategy s(t) and joint type profile t, and C is the lower bound on revenue.
Evaluating the objective
As we mention above, if any constraint fails, the corresponding objective function value W (s(θ ), θ ) is evaluated to −∞. If all the constraints are satisfied, however, the objective must be evaluated with respect to the distribution of player types. Below, we present two approaches for doing this. The first is traditional Bayesian mechanism design, whereas the second is in the spirit of robust optimization, and we term it worst-case mechanism design.
Bayesian mechanism design In Bayesian mechanism design, the designer is presumed to have a belief about the distribution of agents' types. The designer's objective value for a mechanism θ ∈ Θ is evaluated by taking the expectation of W (s(t, θ), t, θ) with respect to the distribution of player types,
We assume for convenience that the designer has the same belief about agent types as the agents themselves, although this assumption could be straightforwardly relaxed.
Worst-case mechanism design
We address the problem of worst-case mechanism design by appealing to the analogous problem in the optimization literature [1] . Robust optimization treats uncertain parameters of an optimization program as though they are selected by an adversary aiming to produce the worst outcome for the problem at hand. The analogy here comes from allowing the adversary to select a profile of player types.
Formally, we can express the robust objective of the designer as
Note that this change is syntactically minor and has no effect on the rest of the framework (replacing the expectation operator with the infimum). However, it entails a computationally infeasible problem of ensuring robustness for every joint type of a possibly infinite type space; anything short of that is no longer really worst-case. To address this problem, we relax the pure robustness criterion to probabilistic robustness. 8 Our relaxation is that the designer is not worried about the worst subset of outcomes of the type space if that subset has very small measure. For example, if the set of types that has probability measure of 0.0001 are extremely unfavorable, their appearance is deemed sufficiently unlikely not to worry the designer. Furthermore, we can probabilistically ascertain that the worst outcome based on a finite number of samples from the type distribution is no better than a large measure of the type space. We refer to the resulting mechanism as probably approximately robust.
To formalize this, suppose that in every exploration step using our framework one takes n samples from the type distribution, T n = {T 1 , . . . , T n }, and then selects the worst value of the objective over these n types:
One would like to select a sufficiently high number of samples n, in order to attain high enough confidence, 1 − α, that the best objective value that he can obtain via L explorations using this framework is approximately robust. The following theorem gives such an n.
Theorem 2 Suppose we select the best design of L candidates, using n samples from the type distribution for each to estimate the value of inf t∈T \T A W (s(t, θ), t, θ), where T A is the set of types with value of W (s(t, θ), t, θ) belowŴ (s(t, θ), t, θ). To attain a confidence of at least 1 − α that the measure of T A is at most p, we need
samples.
In all of our AMD examples and applications below, we use 500 samples to evaluate either the Bayesian or robust objectives, and run 50 iterations of an optimization routine. Theorem 2 then tells us that Pr T A ≤ 0.02 with confidence 1 − α ≥ 0.99.
Extended example: shared-good auction (SGA)

Setup
Consider the problem of two people trying to decide how to allocate a shared good. Unless both players prefer the same allocation, no standard voting mechanism (with either straight votes or a ranking of the alternatives) can help with this problem. We propose a simple SGA: each player submits a bid and the player with the higher bid wins the good, paying some function of the bids to the loser in compensation. Reeves [24] considered a special case of this auction and gave the example of two roommates using it to decide who should get the bigger bedroom and for how much more rent. Cramton et al. [9] and McAfee [15] considered this problem in the context of dissolving partnerships.
We define a space of mechanisms for this problem that are all budget-balanced, individually rational, and (assuming monotone strategies) socially efficient. We then search the mechanism space for games that satisfy additional properties. The following is a payoff function defining a space of games parametrized by a payment function f .
where u(·) gives the utility for an agent who has a value t for winning and bids a against an agent who has value t and bids a . The semantics are that the winner (i.e., the player with the higher bid) pays f (a, a ) to the loser, where a in this case is the winning and a the losing bid. In the tie-breaking case (which occurs with probability zero for many classes of strategies) the payoff is the average of the two other cases because the winner is chosen by a coin flip. We now consider a restriction of the class of mechanisms defined above.
For example, in SGA(1/2, 0) the winner pays half its own bid to the loser; in SGA(0, 1) the winner pays the loser's bid to the loser. More generally, h and k will be the relative proportions of winner's and loser's bids that will be transferred from the winner to the loser. We now give Bayes-Nash equilibria for such games when types are uniformly distributed.
Theorem 3 For h, k ≥ 0 and types U [A, B] with B ≥ A + 1 the following is a symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of SGA(h, k):
For the following discussion, we need to define the notion of truthfulness, or Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility (BNIC).
Definition 8 (BNIC)
A mechanism is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible (truthful) if bidding s(t) = t constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism.
For example, it follows directly from Theorem 3 that SGA(1/3, 0) is BNIC for U [0, B] types. We now show that this is the only truthful mechanism in the SGA(h, k) design space.
Theorem 4 With U [0, B] types (B ≥ 1), SGA(h, k) is BNIC if and only if h
Below, we use this characterization to present concrete examples of the failure of the revelation principle for several sensible designer objectives. 9 Since SGA(1/3, 0) is the only truthful mechanism in our design space, we can directly compare the objective value obtained from this mechanism and the best untruthful mechanism in the sections that follow. From here on we focus on the case of U [0, 1] types.
Automated design problems
Bayesian mechanism design problems
Minimize difference in expected utility First, we consider fairness, or negative difference between the expected utility of winner and loser, as the objective. Formally, the goal is to minimize
We first use the equilibrium bid derived above to analytically characterize optimal mechanisms.
Theorem 5 The difference in expected utility
. Furthermore, SGA(0, k), for any k > 0, minimizes this objective, and the optimal value is 1/9.
By comparison, the objective value for the truthful mechanism, SGA(1/3, 0), is 2/9, twice as high as the minimum produced by an untruthful mechanism. Thus, the revelation principle does not hold for this objective function in the specified design space. We can use Theorem 5 to find that the objective value for SGA(1/2, 0), the mechanism described by [24] , is also 2/9. Now, suppose we do not know about the above analytic derivations, including the characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium. To evaluate the AMD framework, we run the AMD procedure (recall from Sect. 3.1) in "black-box" mode. Table 1 presents results of AMD for two methods of initializing h and k values. Since the objective function turns out to be fairly simple, it is not surprising that we obtain the optimal mechanism for specific and random starting points.
Minimize expected (ex ante) difference in utility
Here we modify the objective function slightly as compared to the previous section, and instead aim to minimize the expected ex ante difference in utility:
Although the only difference from the previous section is the placement of the absolute value sign inside the expectation, this difference complicates the analytic derivation of the optimal design considerably. Therefore, we cannot present the optimum design values in closed form.
The results of application of our AMD framework are presented in Table 2 . Though the objective function in this example appears somewhat complex, it turns out (as we discovered through additional exploration) that there are many mechanisms that yield nearly optimal objective values. 10 Thus, both random restarts as well as a fixed starting point produced essentially the same near-optima. By comparison, the truthful design (SGA(1/3, 0)) yields the objective value of about 0.22, which is considerably worse.
Worst-case mechanism design problems
Minimize nearly-maximal difference in utility Here, we study the problem of probably approximately robust design to minimize maximal difference in players' utility (that is, to 
|u(t, s(t), t , s(t ), k, h) − u(t , s(t ), t, s(t), k, h)|.
Theorem 6 The maximal difference in expected utility in SGA(h, k) (i.e., worst case with respect to agent types) is h + 2k 3(h + k) .
Thus, k = 0 is robust optimal for any h > 0, and the robust optimal value is 1/3.
As one can see from the results in Table 3 , the mechanism produced via the automated framework is optimally robust, as the optimum corresponds to one of the robust designs in Theorem 6.
Of the examples we considered so far, most turned out to be analytic, and one we could approach only numerically. Nevertheless, even in the analytic cases, the objective function forms were not trivial, particularly from a blind optimization perspective. Furthermore, one must take into account that even the simple cases are somewhat complicated by the presence of noise, and thus one need not arrive at global optima even in the simplest of settings without a very large number of samples.
Having found success in the simple SGA setting, we now turn our attention to a series of considerably more difficult problems.
Applications
We present results from several applications of our AMD framework to specific two-player problems. One of these problems, finding auctions that yield maximum revenue to the designer, has been studied in a seminal paper by Myerson [19] in a much more general setting than the one we consider. Another, which seeks to find auctions that maximize social welfare, has also been studied more generally. For these, and other instances we were able to solve analytically, we can compare the AMD results to a known benchmark. Others have no known optimal design.
An important consideration in any optimization routine is the choice of a starting point. This could be especially relevant where AMD is used as a tool to enhance an already working mechanism through parametrized search. We explore this possibility in one of our applications, using a previously studied design as a starting point. Additionally, we apply our framework to every application with completely randomly seeded optimization runs, taking the best result of five randomly seeded runs in order to mitigate the problem of local optima. Furthermore, we enhance the optimization procedure by using a guided restart, that is, by running the optimization procedure once using the current best mechanism as a new starting point. Each optimization run lasted up to several hours: the actual running time was determined in part by the running time of RW solver in computing Bayes-Nash equilibria.
In all of our applications, player types are independently distributed with uniform distribution on the unit interval. We used 50 samples from the type distribution to verify ExInterim-IR throughout the run of the AMD framework. If all samples satisfy the constraint, this gives us 0.95 probability that 94% of types lose no more than the opportunity cost plus a specified tolerance we add to ensure that the presence of noise does not overconstrain the problem. If we choose to fully account for the fact that we are verifying this constraint in each of 50 optimization iterations, we get a very pessimistic bound of 0.08 on the probability that it is satisfied for the mechanism ultimately found by the framework. However, note that most iterations consider mechanisms found to be infeasible. Thus, for example, if we instead suppose that the "real" choice was between 10 feasible, high-quality mechanisms, we obtain a much more palatable bound of 0.6. It turns out that every application that we consider produces a mechanism that is individually rational for all types with respect to the tolerance level that was set. Thus, our choice of parameters here is ultimately empirically justified. Once the final mechanism is produced, we "fix" Ex-Interim-IR by computing the difference between expected value and payment of the least fortunate type both analytically and by sampling over types. The computational verification of Ex-Interim-IR uses 10 times as many samples to estimate expected value and payment to each type as during the standard run of the framework. We report both the actual and approximated Ex-Interim-IR adjustment below.
One problem with choosing a mechanism that is empirically maximal is that a mediocre or poor mechanism could be chosen merely because of a lucky sample, or, perhaps, because by some fortunate coincidence it had passed the empirical constraint test even while in reality violating it. Noting that this problem is only important with mechanisms that are "current best" (that is, those that are better than any that were previously encountered during the optimization run), we periodically reevaluate the objective of the current best mechanism (specifically, we do so with probability 0.2 in every iteration).
Myerson auctions
The seminal paper by Myerson [19] presented a theoretical derivation of revenue maximizing auctions in a relatively general setting. Here, our aim is to find a mechanism with a nearly optimal value of some given objective function, of which revenue is an example. However, we restrict ourselves to a considerably less general setting than did Myerson, 11 constraining the design space to that described by the parameters in (4).
We further constrain all the design parameters to be in the interval [0,1]. In standard terminology, the designer specifies the probability q that the winner (i.e., agent with the larger bid) gets the good, along with a schedule of transfers that are linear in agents' bids.
Bayesian mechanism design problems
Maximize revenue We begin by seeking approximately revenue-maximizing designs in our parametrized design space. Based on Myerson's feasibility constraints, we derive in the following theorem that an optimal incentive compatible mechanism in this design space yields revenue of 1/3 to the designer, 12 as compared to 0.425 in the general two-player case. 13
Lemma 1 The mechanism in the design space described by the parameters in (4) is BNIC and Ex-Interim-IR if and only if k
3 = k 4 = K 1 = K 2 = 0 and q − k 1 − 0.5k 2 = 0.5.
Theorem 7
An optimal incentive compatible mechanism in our setting yields revenue of 1/3, which can be achieved by selecting q = 1, k 1 ∈ [0, 0.5], and k 2 ∈ [0, 1], respecting the constraint that k 1 + 0.5k 2 = 0.5.
The AMD procedure produced the design in Table 4 . We now verify the Ex-Interim-IR and revenue properties of this design. Table 4 is Ex-Interim-IR and yields expected revenue of approximately 0.3. Furthermore, the designer could gain an additional 0.0058 in expected revenue without effect on incentives while maintaining the IR constraint.
Theorem 8 The design described in
By verifying Ex-Interim-IR computationally, we find that the designer would gain an additional 0.0057 using participation fees, only slightly below an "optimal" setting of such fees described in the theorem. Thus, our AMD framework produced a design near to the best known. It is an open question what the actual global optimum is.
Maximize welfare It is well known that the Vickrey auction is welfare-optimal. Thus, we know that the welfare optimum is attainable in the specified design space. Before proceeding with search, however, we must make one observation. While we are interested in welfare, it would be inadvisable in general to completely ignore the designer's revenue, since the designer is unlikely to be persuaded to run a mechanism at a disproportionate loss. To remedy this problem, we use a minimum revenue constraint, ensuring that no mechanism that is too costly will be selected as optimal.
First, we present a general result that characterizes welfare-optimal mechanisms in our setting.
Theorem 9
Welfare is maximized if either the equilibrium bid function is strictly increasing and q = 1 or the equilibrium bid function is strictly decreasing and q = 0. Furthermore, the maximum expected welfare in the specified design space is 2/3.
Thus, for example, both first-and second-price sealed bid auctions are welfare maximizing (as is well known). In Table 5 we present the result of our search for optimal design. We verified using the RW solver that the bid function s(t) = 0.645t − 0.44 is an equilibrium given this design. Since it is strictly increasing in t, we can conclude based on Theorem 9 that this design is welfareoptimal. We need only to verify that both the minimum revenue and the IR constraints hold. Table 5 Computationally verifying the Ex-Interim-IR gap we find that the designer could gain 0.128, exactly as described in the theorem. It is interesting that this auction, besides being welfareoptimal, also yields a slightly higher revenue to the designer than our mechanism in the previous section if we implement the modification proposed in Theorem 10. Thus, there appears to be some synergy between optimal welfare and optimal revenue in our design setting. 
Theorem 10 The design described in
Worst-case mechanism design problems
Maximize nearly-minimal revenue The objective in this section is to maximize minimal revenue to the designer over the entire joint type space. Formally, the objective function is inf t,t ∈T |s(t)>s(t )
Assuming symmetry, here is a simple result about the set of mechanisms that yields 0 for the objective in (5).
Theorem 11
Any auction with K 1 = K 2 = 0 which induces equilibrium strategies in the form s(t) = mt with m > 0 yields 0 as the value of the objective in (5).
Thus, both first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions result in the value of 0 for the worst-case objective. Furthermore, by Lemma 1 it follows that the same is true for any BNIC and ex interim individually rational mechanism in the specified design space.
Since it is far from clear what the actual optimum is for this problem or for its probably approximately robust equivalent, we ran our automated framework to obtain an approximately optimal design, shown in Table 6 .
Theorem 12
The mechanism in Table 6 Computing the "fix" automatically, we would pay each agent slightly more, and would then lose 0.000067 in revenue. Thus, we confirm that while not precisely individually rational, our mechanism is very nearly so, and with a small adjustment becomes individually rational with little cost to the designer. Furthermore, the designer is able to make a positive (albeit small) profit no matter what the joint type of the agents.
Auctions with anti-social bidders
In this section we study a mechanism design problem motivated by the vicious Vickrey auction [2, 3, 18, 24] . Auction games with anti-social bidders capture a notion of spite, where each player gets disutility from the surplus of the other, to a degree modeled by parameter l. For example, the standard Vickrey auction is a special case of the vicious Vickrey auction with l = 0.
We further generalize auctions with anti-social bidders beyond Vickrey to cover the Myerson-inspired family of mechanisms discussed in Sect. 5.1 above. Formally, the auction utility of an anti-social bidder is described by the following parametrized form.
The vicious Vickrey auction is a special case of (6) with q = k 2 = 1 and
The Myerson auction utility function (4) analyzed in the previous section is likewise a special case with l = 0. For all the analysis below, we fix l = 2/7. Reeves [24] reports an equilibrium for vicious Vickrey with this value of l to be s(t) = (7/9)t + 2/9. Thus, we can see that we are no longer assured incentive compatibility even in the second-price auction case. In general, it is unclear whether there exist incentive compatible mechanisms in this design space, particularly because we constrain all the parameters to be in the interval [0, 1].
For this setting, we adopt a slightly modified definition of IR: every agent can earn nonnegative expected value less expected payment (that is, expected surplus). 14 To formalize, we constrain that
EU(t) = v(t) − m(t) ≥ 0, where v(t) = q E s(t)>s(t ) [t] + (1 − q)E s(t)<s(t ) [t] + 0.5E s(t)=s(t ) [t]
is the expected net value (type less cost, in the "traditional sense") to agent with type t and
m(t) = E s(t)>s(t
is the expected payment to the auctioneer by the agent with type t.
Bayesian mechanism design problems
Maximize revenue The first objective is to (nearly) maximize revenue. The results of AMD in two distinct cases are presented in Table 7 . The top part of Table 7 presents the results of simulated annealing search that uses the previously studied vicious Vickrey as a starting point. Our purpose for doing so is twofold. First, we would like to see if we can easily (i.e., via an automated process) do better than the previously studied mechanism. Second, we want to suggest AMD as a framework not only for finding good mechanisms from scratch, but We now give the IR and revenue properties of the auction that AMD obtains with vicious Vickrey as the starting point.
Theorem 14
The expected revenue from the auction 1, 0, 0.98, 0.09, 0.33, 0, 0 in Table 7 is approximately 0.49. This auction is Ex-Interim-IR, and will remain so if the designer charges a fixed entry fee of 0.0027, giving itself a total revenue of approximately 0.4932.
Verifying Ex-Interim-IR computationally, we would charge each agent 0.000685, giving us 0.00137 in gain, slightly below the "optimal" prescription in the theorem. Thus, we found a design which yields more revenue than the design previously studied in the literature (adjusted to be individually rational).
Next, we performed search from a random starting point. The results are shown in the lower section of Table 7 . Properties of the resulting auction are explored in Theorem 15.
Theorem 15
The expected revenue from the auction 1, 1, 0.33, 0.22, 0.22, 0.12, 0 in Table 7 Computationally verifying Ex-Interim-IR in this case yields a revenue increase of 0.38, only a little bit below the optimal adjustment. Thus, the design we obtained from a completely random starting point yields revenue that is not far below that of vicious Vickrey (or the design that we found using vicious Vickrey as a starting point), and is better than vicious Vickrey if the latter is adjusted to be individually rational. Furthermore, this design can be improved considerably via a participation tax without sacrificing IR.
Maximize welfare In Table 8 we present an outcome of the AMD process with the goal of maximizing welfare. In the optimization, we utilized both the Ex-Interim-IR and minimum revenue constraints. In the following theorem we establish the welfare, revenue, and IR properties of this mechanism. By computing the amount of violation in Ex-Interim-IR in an automated mode, we would sacrifice 0.132 in revenue, slightly more than the amount prescribed based on an exact derivation. Thus, while IR does not hold for almost 80% of types, this failure is easy to remedy at some additional loss in revenue (importantly, the adjusted expected revenue is positive).
Theorem 16 The expected welfare of the mechanism in
Nevertheless, after a sequence of successful applications of AMD, we stand before an evident failure: the mechanism we found is quite a bit below the known optimum of 2/3. Interestingly, recall that the optimal revenue mechanism in the anti-social auction setting had a strictly increasing bid function and q = 1, and consequently was also welfare-optimal by Theorem 9.
We hypothesize that the most important reason for the poor results is that we introduced nonnegative revenue as a hard constraint. From observing the optimization runs in general, we notice that the optimization problem both in the Myerson auctions and the anti-social auctions design space seems to be rife with islands of local optima in the sea of infeasibility. Thus, the problem was difficult for black-box optimization already, and we made it considerably more difficult by adding more infeasible regions. In general, we would expect such optimization techniques to work best when the objective function varies smoothly and most of the space is feasible. Hard constraints make it more difficult by introducing (at least in our implementation) spikes in the objective value. 15 We have seen some evidence to the correctness of our hypothesis already, since our revenue-optimal design also happens to maximize social utility. To test our hypothesis directly, we remove minimum revenue as a hard constraint in the next section, and instead try to maximize the weighted sum of welfare and revenue.
Maximize weighted sum of revenue and welfare In this section, we present results of AMD with the goal of maximizing the weighted sum of revenue and welfare. 16 For simplicity (and having no reason for doing otherwise), we set weights to be equal.
A design that our framework found from a random starting point is presented in Table 9 . We verified using RW that s(t) = 0.935t − 0.18 is an (approximate) symmetric equilibrium bid function. Thus, by Theorem 9 this auction is welfare-optimal. Table 9 In computational mode, we find the revenue loss to be 0.088, exactly the same as in the theorem. Interestingly, we were much more successful in both revenue and welfare objectives by eliminating the hard minimum revenue constraint and instead making it a part of the objective. Indeed, we found here the best mechanism so far for both objectives we considered, suggesting that there is substantial synergy between the two objectives.
Theorem 17 The expected revenue from the auction in
Worst-case mechanism design problems
Maximize nearly-minimal revenue We now apply our framework to the problem of maximizing worst-case revenue of the designer. First, we present the result for the previously studied vicious Vickrey auction. The results from running our automated design framework from a random starting point are shown in Table 10 . We now verify the revenue and IR properties of this mechanism. Computationally we find that each agent should be paid 0.01 for participation, yielding 0.039 in adjusted revenue, or very near that given the optimal adjustment. As we can see, the randomly generated design is considerably worse than the adjusted vicious Vickrey. However, adjusted vicious Vickrey requires negative settings of several of the design parameters. Since the parameters are initially constrained to be nonnegative, it is unclear whether a better solution is indeed attainable in the specified constrained design space, even at a slight (<0.02) sacrifice in IR.
Theorem 18 By running the vicious Vickrey auction, the designer can obtain at least
Truthful mechanisms
While this article comes, in part, to address a need for designing general-that is, not necessarily truthful (or even direct)-mechanisms, we now revisit incentive compatible mechanism design. A natural question that may arise from the above examples is whether we can, perhaps, do better by only searching through a space of (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatible mechanisms. Recall, for example, that our automatically generated mechanism in the context of "Myerson" revenue maximization (Sect. 5.1.1) failed to match the optimal truthful auction (although came relatively close).
Operationalizing the idea of searching in the space of truthful mechanisms in general is not immediate. One way we can do this is to constrain the parameter space to guarantee truthfulness, per Lemma 1. However, this would require us to derive characterizations of BNIC in every context. An approach more in the spirit of AMD is to include incentive compatibility as a constraint [5] . The danger, however, is that this additional constraint would prove too much for our implementation, since the space of incentive compatible mechanisms is quite small. As we shall see, the problem with overconstraining optimization can be solved by moving constraints into the objective, that is, by the use of penalty methods [21] .
BNIC constraint
Our first step is to formally define the BNIC constraint. 17
Definition 9
The BNIC constraint is satisfied when for every agent i ∈ I , and for every type
Again, in the AMD framework, we must modify the classical definition of BNIC to a probabilistic constraint.
Definition 10
The (1 − p)-strong BNIC constraint is satisfied when for every agent i ∈ I , and for a set of types t i ∈ T i with probability measure no less than 1
where δ is some a priori fixed tolerance level.
Since the maximization in the above definition is still over the possibly infinite set of deviations T i , we can repeat the exercise and focus on making statements about a "large measure" of deviations in T i , and take the maximum over a finite sample of types. We do not make the extension formally since it is relatively direct and entirely analogous to the p-strong relaxation of constraints, as well as our relaxation of worst-case mechanism design above.
Application to revenue maximization in Myerson auctions
We now search for revenue-optimal Myerson auctions in the parameter space identified in Sect. 5.1, with the additional BNIC constraint. Recall that an optimal BNIC mechanism in this setting yields revenue of 1/3, so we have a precise bar for which to strive.
Above, we suspected that perhaps the addition of BNIC constraint would prove too much for the current AMD implementation, in which a constraint failure returns negative infinity as the objective value. These fears proved true: we failed to find a feasible mechanism over a series of runs. We consequently made a modification to the basic framework as regards constraints: all constraints are moved into the objective and their failure magnitude is penalized, as is standard in penalty methods [21] . It turns out that there is a natural way to measure the magnitude of constraint failure for both the Ex-Interim-IR and the BNIC constraints. In the former case, the magnitude of failure for a particular player i and type t i is (upon setting the opportunity cost to zero):
We then take the maximum constraint failure over all types and players. Similarly, the magnitude of failure of the BNIC constraint for player i and type t i is max
which, upon maximizing over players and types, yields the well-known notion of game-theoretic regret. Naturally, these are approximated in our implementation by taking the maxima over a finite set of player types (and a finite set of deviations t i in the case of the BNIC constraint). In the experiments we checked 50 player types and 11 deviations (we also restricted deviations to the unit interval, since the designer would commonly constrain bids to be positive, and it seems reasonable to also prevent bids above the highest possible valuation).
The mechanism obtained by running the search procedure is presented in Table 11 . We used penalty values of 3 for the initial five runs and 4 for the final run, identical for both constraints. To begin, let us compare the results above to Lemma 1 and Theorem 7. We can readily observe that some of the preconditions of BNIC and Ex-Interim-IR hold, specifically, that k 3 = k 4 = K 1 = K 2 = 0. Indeed, it is easy to verify that Ex-Interim-IR holds, since k 1 + k 2 < 1. As Lemma 1 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for BNIC, we can also easily confirm that BNIC in our mechanism is not satisfied: the condition that q − k 1 − 0.5k 2 = 0.5 fails. Nevertheless, the mechanism may well be sufficiently close to truthful for practical purposes if players do not have very much to gain by deviating. To compute the gain from deviation for a fixed player i with type t i , first note that expected utility to this player for playing t i is
which is maximized at t i = s i (t i ) ≈ 0.62t i . The gain to optimal deviation from truthful bidding is then 0.62t
Thus, while regret is non-zero, it is a relatively small proportion of a player's type, even in the worst case. 18 We can verify that the revenue of this mechanism, under the assumption of truthful bidding, is approximately 0.533, much higher than the optimal revenue of 1/3 in a perfectly truthful auction. Therein, we have a tradeoff: bidders now have some regret, but the designer can obtain considerably higher revenue.
By applying the RW solver, we can compute the actual equilibrium of this auction as well, which turns out to be s * i (t i ) ≈ 0.62t i . 19 If players play this equilibrium, the expected revenue falls to 0.332, or very nearly the BNIC optimal revenue of 1/3. Since players shade their bids relative to true valuations, the Ex-Interim-IR constraint is still satisfied. Consequently, even if players take full advantage of deviation opportunities and end up in equilibrium, the designer obtains a payoff nearly as high as the best mechanisms known.
In claiming near incentive compatibility above, we do so by calibrating regret with respect to the magnitude of a player's type (valuation). While this is reasonable, an alternative way to calibrate regret is by comparing it to a player's payoff. In this metric, our mechanism does not do so well: a player can gain as much as 55% of payoff by deviating. Naturally, it is easy in our framework to redefine regret to consider gains relative to a player's payoff. We have implemented this alternative definition of regret, but our framework was unable to find a good mechanism in this case. 20 If we consider Lemma 1, this failure should be predictable: forcing both BNIC and Ex-Interim-IR to be satisfied restricts the space of feasible mechanisms greatly, making the optimization problem nearly impossible if done blindly. An alternative is to use the structural characteristics obtained in the lemma to enforce the desired constraints. Running the AMD framework while enforcing the constraints on parameters prescribed by the lemma, we obtain a mechanism with q = 0.994, k 1 = 0.342 and k 2 = 0.303 (with other parameters forced to 0 by the conditions of the lemma). Since BNIC and Ex-Interim-IR have been artificially satisfied, we need only check the expected revenue, which can be verified to be 0.329, or nearly the BNIC optimum of 1/3.
Conclusion
We presented a framework for AMD using the Bayes-Nash equilibrium solver for infinite games developed by Reeves [25] . Results from applying this framework to several auction domains demonstrate the value of our approach for parametrized mechanism design. The mechanisms that we found were typically either close to the best known mechanisms, or better.
Whereas in principle it is not surprising that we can find mechanisms by searching the design space-as long as we have an equilibrium finding tool-it remains to establish that any such system would have practical merit. We presented evidence that mechanism design in a constrained space can indeed be effectively automated on somewhat realistic design problems that yield infinite games of incomplete information. Undoubtedly, real design problems can be vastly more complicated than any that we considered (or any that can be solved theoretically). In such cases, we believe that our approach could offer considerable benefit if used in conjunction with other techniques, either to provide a starting point for design, or to tune a mechanism produced via theoretical analysis and computational experiments.
Since the samples are i.i.d.,
and since we assumed a uniform prior on r , we get
Consequently, we obtain the following relationship between α, p, and n:
Solving for n, we get n = log α log(1 − p) − 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose p is the probability measure of T A and suppose we select the best θ i of {θ 1 , . . . , θ L }. Suppose further that we take n samples for each θ j , and let T n be the set of n type realizations. We also use the notation θ ∈ G to indicate an event that for a particular θ , min t∈T n W (r, t, θ) > inf t∈T \T A W (r, t, θ). We would like to compute the number of samples n for each of these samples such that
Thus,
Solving for n, we obtain the desired answer.
Proof of Theorem 3
We show that for the two-player game with types U [A, B] and payoff function
with h, k ≥ 0 and B ≥ A + 1 that the following is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy:
Consider first the special case that h = k = 0. (7) prescribes a strategy of bidding ∞ and it is clear that this is a dominant strategy in a game where the winner is the high bidder with no payments required. 21 We now assume that h + k > 0.
Define m ≡ 1 3(h+k) and c ≡ h A+k B 6(h+k) 2 and let T be a random U [A, B] variable giving the opponent's type. Noting that the tie-breaking case (a = a ) happens with zero probability given that (7) is a continuous function of a uniform random variable, we write the expected utility for an agent of type t playing action a as
We consider three cases on the range of a and find the optimal action a * i for each case i.
The probabilities in (8) are zero and one, respectively, and so the expected utility is:
This is an increasing function in a, implying an optimal action at the right boundary: a * 1 = Am + c. Thus the best expected utility for case 1 is
The probabilities in (8) are one and zero, respectively, and so the expected utility is:
This is a decreasing function in a, implying an optimal action at the left boundary: a * 2 = Bm + c. Thus the best expected utility for case 2 is
Case 3: Am + c < a < Bm + c.
Knowing that a−c
m is between A and B it is straightforward to compute the probabilities in (8) and the conditional expectation of T . So we write EU(t, a) as: 
Since this is a concave function of a the maximum is where the derivative with respect to a is zero, that is (skipping the tedious algebra for which we used Mathematica):
is in fact in the allowable range for case 3. The expected utility for case 3 is then
It now remains to show that neither EU(t, a * 1 ) nor EU(t, a * 2 ) is greater than EU(t, a * 3 ) for any t.
Since t ≥ A there exists a δ ≥ 0 such that t = A + δ. And since B ≥ A + 1 there exists an ε ≥ 0 such that
Proof of Theorem 4
It is direct from Theorem 3 that setting h = 1/3 and k = 0 yields a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium s(t) = t when A = 0. We now show that the best response to truthful bidding is only truthful under this parameter setting-i.e., that SGA(1/3, 0) is the only BNIC game in the SGA family, for U [0, B] types. Suppose that the opponent bids truthfully (i.e., s(t) = t for one of the agents). First, assume that a ∈ [0, B]. The expected utility of an agent with type t from bidding a is then
Since this function is strictly concave in a, we can use the first-order condition to find the optimum bid:
which is truthful for every type t only when h = 1/3 and k = 0. Now, if a ≤ 0, it will always lose, and the expected utility is
which is maximized when a = 0. Consequently, there is no incentive to ever bid below 0. Similarly, if a ≥ B, the agent will never lose, and
which is maximized when a = B. Thus, there is no incentive to ever bid above B. All incentive compatible mechanisms will thus induce bidding according to (9) . It follows, then, that SGA(1/3, 0) is the only truthful mechanism for U [0, B] (B > 0) types. The extension to A > 0 is straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 5
Define t w and t l to be the "winner's" (one who ultimately gets the item) and "loser's" types respectively. The objective function in terms of h and k is min h,k
Since E[t w | t w > t l ] is the expectation of the first order statistic of two U [0, 1] random variables, it is 2/3 (and 1/3 for t l ). Thus, the objective function above reduces to
.
We now show that this expression cannot be less than 1/9:
Since setting h = 0 yields the minimum of 1/9 for any k > 0 we conclude that all mechanisms SGA(0, k) minimize the objective function.
Proof of Theorem 6
First, we obtain the expression to be minimized.
Clearly, this is minimized when t = 1 and t = 0, yielding
Thus, the expression cannot be less than 1/3. Consequently, since setting k = 0 for any h > 0 results in the objective function value of 1/3, it describes a subset of optimal values.
Proof of Lemma 1
First, let us derive Q(q, t) and U (q, x, t), where q is the probability that player with the higher type wins the good and x(t) is the expected payment by players [19] .
The first constraint that must be satisfied according to [19] 
is if s ≤ t then Q(q, s) ≤ Q(q, t).
This constraint is always satisfied in our design space by inspection of the form of Q(q, t) above.
IR constraint requires that U (q, x, 0) ≥ 0, implying in our setting that 0.5k 4 + K 2 ≤ 0. Since all design parameters are constrained to be nonnegative, this implies that k 4 = K 2 = 0, and, consequently, U (q, x, 0) = 0.
The version of the final constraint in [19] in our setting
implies that K 1 = k 3 = 0 and q − k 1 − 0.5k 2 − 0.5 = 0, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7
The expected revenue to the designer is
which by symmetry and Lemma 1 is equivalent to
Rewriting the constraint from Lemma 1 to be k 1 + 0.5k 2 = q − 0.5, it is clear that the revenue is maximal when q = 1. Now, if we let k = k 1 and k 2 = 1 − 2k, the expected revenue becomes (2/3)k + (1/3)(1 − 2k) = 1/3. Thus, we can set any k 1 ∈ [0, 0.5] and k 2 ∈ [0, 1], respecting the constraint, to achieve optimal revenue of 1/3.
Proof of Theorem 8
We use the equilibrium bids of s(t) = 0.72t − 0.73 in this proof. First, let us derive the expected payment of an agent with type t, which we designate by m(t). We simplify our task by taking advantage of strict monotonicity of the equilibrium bid function in t. By symmetry, the expected revenue is twice the expectation of m(t):
To confirm IR, we need to compute the expected value to an agent with type t from this auction, which we label v(t):
The expected utility to an agent with type t is its expected value less expected payment:
Clearly, this is always positive. Furthermore, the designer can charge each agent an additional participation fee of 0.0029 and maintain IR. Since this uniform fee will not affect agents' incentives, the designer will gain an additional 0.0058 in revenue without compromising the IR constraint.
Proof of Theorem 9
The intuition for the proof is straightforward. Suppose that the equilibrium bid function is strictly increasing and q = 1. Then, since the high bidder always gets the good, and the higher type is always the high bidder, the good always goes to the agent that values it more. Consequently, this design yields optimal welfare. The reverse argument works in the other case. Formally, expected welfare is
where p is the probability that the high type gets the good. Since the probability that types of both agents are equal is 0, the third term is 0. Furthermore, E t,T [t | t > T ] = 2/3, since this is just the first order statistic of the type distribution, and E t,T [t | t < T ] = 1/3 since it is the second order statistic of the type distribution. Consequently, expected welfare is (2/3) p + (1/3)(1 − p). This is maximized when p = 1, and the maximal value is 2/3. Now, if bid function is increasing in t, then q = p = 1 ensures optimality. If bid function is decreasing in t, on the other hand, q = (1 − p) = 0 ensures optimality.
Proof of Theorem 10
We work with the symmetric equilibrium bid of s(t) = 0.645t − 0.44. Since we have already shown the optimality of this mechanism, we just need to confirm IR and compute the revenue from this auction.
As before, we start with computing the payment of an agent with type t: The expected value of an agent, v(t) is just t 2 , since the high type always gets the good. Consequently, expected utility to an agent is EU(t) = v(t) − m(t) = 0.50012t 2 + 0.0025t + 0.064.
Since this is always nonnegative when t ∈ [0, 1], ex interim IR constraint holds. Note also that it will hold weakly if we charge each participant 0.064 for entering the auction. Thus, the designer could gain an additional 0.128 in revenue without affecting incentives, welfare optimality, and IR.
Proof of Theorem 11
Since we are assuming symmetry and the equilibrium bid function is increasing in t, the objective is equivalent to 
Proof of Theorem 12
We use the symmetric equilibrium bid of (approximately) s(t) = 0.43t − 0.51. First we establish the worst-case revenue properties of the design. By symmetry, the worst-case objective is equivalent to which attains its minimum when t = 2/11, with the minimum value of −44/2178 (just under -0.02). Thus, it is not individually rational. To fix the mechanism, the designer could afford each agent 0.021 for participation, reducing his revenue to 0.438.
Proof of Theorem 14
We use the symmetric equilibrium bid of s(t) = 1.613t − 0.234. First, we compute expected payment of type t: Since the high bidder always gets the good, v(t) = t 2 , and the expected utility of type t is then EU(t) = 0.74192t 2 − 0.47019t + 0.07722.
The function EU(t) is always positive, and the minimum gain for any agent type is 0.00273. Thus, the designer could charge an entry fee of 0.0027 and gain an additional 0.0054 in revenue, for a total of 0.4932.
Proof of Theorem 15
In this case, we use the symmetric equilibrium bid of s(t) = 0.595t − 0.2. The expected payment of type t is m(t) = Since q = 1, v(t) = t 2 , and, therefore EU(t) = 0.473425t 2 − 0.1529t + 0.0323, which we can verify is always positive. Thus, this design is ex interim individually rational. Since its minimum value is slightly above 0.0199, we can bill this amount to each agent for participating in the auction without affecting incentives or ex interim IR. This adjustment will give the designer 0.0398 of additional revenue, for a total of about 0.4798.
Proof of Theorem 16
We use the symmetric equilibrium bid function s(t) = −0.22t − 0.175 here.
Since the bids are strictly decreasing in types, the expected value of type t is The expected utility of an agent with type t is EU(t) = v(t) − m(t) = 0.4951t 2 − 0.2441t − 0.01355, which is negative for a fairly broad range of types (although always above the tolerance level that we set). Type t * = 0.24652 fairs the worst, incurring a loss of nearly 0.044. However, by compensating both agents this amount, we ensure ex interim IR without affecting incentives. As a result, the designer will lose 0.088 in expected revenue, which will fall to 0.5198.
Proof of Theorem 18
By symmetry, the objective value is equivalent to inf t>T s(T ) = inf t>T 7 9 T + 2 9 = 2/9.
The rest follows by Theorem 13.
Proof of Theorem 19
The objective value is equivalent to which attains a minimum value of -0.00945. Thus, the participation award of 0.00945 to each agent is necessary to make this design individually rational, with the resulting worst-case revenue of 0.04.
